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JUDICIAL REVIEW, LOCAL VALUES, AND PLURALISM
RICHARD W. GARNETT*
I.
"It is," the Twenty-Seventh Annual National Federalist Soci-
ety Student Symposium program reports, "a basic assumption
of federalism that individual communities can be different;
they may have different values, and they will certainly have
different laws." 1 This is true. Notwithstanding American Idol,
Starbucks, USA Today, and chain restaurants, individual com-
munities not only can be different, they are different. They often
sit on opposite sides of what commentator David Brooks has
called the "meatloaf line," which divides places with "sun-
dried-tomato concoctions on restaurant menus" from those
with "meatloaf platters."2 Even before the 2000 election, and
the explosion of "Red-versus-Blue"-themed social commen-
* Professor of Law, University of Notre Dame Law School. I am grateful to the
Federalist Society for the invitation to participate in the Twenty-Seventh Annual
National Federalist Society Student Symposium, held at the University of Michi-
gan Law School in Ann Arbor, Michigan. Portions of these remarks are taken
from, or based on, some earlier works of mine, including Richard W. Garnett,
William H. Rehnquist: A Life Lived Greatly, and Well, 115 YALE L.J. 1847 (2006); Rich-
ard W. Garnett, Chief Justice Rehnquist's Enduring, Democratic Constitution, 29
HARV. J.L & PUB. POL'Y 395 (2006); Richard W. Garnett, Right On, LEGAL AFF.,
Mar./Apr. 2005, at 34; Richard W. Garnett, The Story of Henry Adams's Soul: Educa-
tion and the Expression of Associations, 85 MINN. L. REV. 1841 (2001) [hereinafter
Garnett, Henry Adams's Soul].
1. See Posting of Richard W. Garnett to PrawfsBlawg, http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/
prawfsblawg/2008/03/the-fed-soc-sym.html (Mar. 10, 2008, 10:13 EDT) ("The daims
presented for the panel's consideration were, first, that 'it is a basic assumption of
federalism that individual communities can be different'; second, that 'it is a bene-
fit of federalism that free people can "vote with their feet" and migrate to com-
munities that share their values'; and, third, that 'pervasive judicial review' can
undermine this benefit, and this assumption, and 'destroy local identity by ho-
mogenizing community norms."').
2. See David Brooks, One Nation, Slightly Divisible, ATL. MONTHLY, Dec. 2001, at
54, available at http://www.theatlantic.com/issues/2001/12/brooks.htm.
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tary, 3 it should not have been controversial to note that the
communities of San Francisco and Provo "have different val-
ues" -not entirely different, of course, but still different. And,
if the legal enterprise involves, among other things, an effort to
order our lives together in a way that reflects and promotes our
understandings of human flourishing, then we should not be
surprised that communities' "different values" often translate
into "different laws."
The question presented to this panel was: Does pervasive ju-
dicial review threaten to destroy local identity by homogeniz-
ing community norms?4 The short and correct, even if too
quick, answer to this question is "yes." That is, pervasive judi-
cial review certainly does threaten local identity. It does so, in
part, because judicial review can homogenize community
norms, either by dragging them into conformity with national,
constitutional standards or, more controversially, by subordi-
nating them to the reviewers' own commitments.
To say this is neither to criticize judicial review nor to cele-
brate excessively local identity; it is to identify neither the point
at which judicial review becomes pervasive nor the point at
which possibilities become threats. If we aspire to more than
stating the obvious, we should reach for clarity about what are
and are not the problems with and risks of judicial review, and
also about what is and is not important about respecting com-
munity norms and protecting them from homogenization. We
need to ask, for example, how much room the Constitution
leaves for legal experiments that reflect local values.5 When
must legal expressions of local values give way to legal expres-
sions of national ones? And who decides?
It is true that an important feature of our federalism is local
variation in laws and values. It is also true, however, that some
values have been homogenized, not by judicial review, perva-
sive or otherwise, but by the ratification of the Constitution,
3. See Paul Farhi, Elephants are Red, Donkeys are Blue, WASH. POST, Nov. 2, 2004,
at C1.
4. See Garnett, supra note 1.
5. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dis-
senting) ("It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single cou-
rageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social
and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country. This Court has
the power to prevent an experiment.").
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which is the "supreme Law of the land. .. , any Thing in the
Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwith-
standing."6 Our federalism proceeds from the premise that in-
dividual communities can be different, but it also reflects a vi-
sion of national citizenship, some fundamental moral
commitments, and a common project. It is a basic assumption
of federalism that local communities may have different values.
But it is also a basic assumption of federalism that the national
Union is committed to some shared values, that separate com-
munities are bound by some shared laws, and that there were
and are reasons for America's distinct communities to come to-
gether and form, in the words of the Preamble, a "more perfect
Union." 7 Our various local communities and political subdivi-
sions are not merely next to each other in space; they do not
simply share a continent and currency. They are meaningfully
"united."
Of course, to gesture toward the Supremacy Clause and our
nation's name is hardly to answer the hard and interesting
questions that the panel's topic prompts. Still, even this gesture
is enough to remind us that the text, history, structure, and
theoretical premises of the Constitution point toward the im-
portance of both diverse local "laboratories of democracy"' and
a larger, national community-a Union constituted by "We the
People."9 Vindicating the values and aims of this national
community will sometimes require constraining, revising, or
rejecting some laboratories' experiments and some expressions
in law of local majorities' values.
Americans often talk and think about the potential conflict
between judicial review and local values in terms common to
the discussion of dual sovereignty. That is, we ask, "Which
government's policy choice, the federal government's or the
state's, wins out here?" in a way that invites an answer
couched in a states' rights idiom. The Constitution's liberty-
protecting structural features should, instead, be understood
more in terms of limited and enumerated powers than in terms
6. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
7. U.S. CONST. pmbl.
8. See New State Ice Co., 285 U.S. at 311 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
9. U.S. CONST. pmbl.
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of states' rights.10 The Constitution appreciates, reflects, and
incorporates pluralism and local values in a particular way,
namely, by stating clearly that the national government and its
various branches have only those powers that are "delegated to
the United States by the Constitution.""1 And so, federal courts
have the power-the "judicial Power of the United States"-to
decide cases "arising under [the] Constitution." 12 They do not
have the power to survey the national scene looking for local
values and community norms in need of revision or homogeni-
zation, or to discover abstract rights and liberties in need of
vindication. 13 That said, sometimes in the context of doing
what it is authorized and supposed to do, a federal court will,
and should, refuse to enforce a law that reflects the norms and
values of a particular community. Such a refusal admittedly
can appear to be a judicial interference with community values
and will, in some cases, result in or aim toward the homogeniz-
ing of norms. But again, the Constitution itself makes some such
judicial interference unavoidable because its text and structure
both permit and call for it. The questions, then, are not so much
whether federal courts may or should interfere with community
values, but when and how they should do so.
Both the Constitution and sound political theory counsel
deference and restraint on the part of federal judges. 14 It is,
however, easy to imagine exasperation on the part of those
scholars and commentators who insist that words like "defer-
ence," "restraint," and "activism" are not uncontested, and
who warn that these terms can be, and sometimes are, misused
in discussions about the Court and the Constitution.1 5 This is
true enough. The political use of "judicial activism" rhetoric is
10. See Richard W. Garnett, The New Federalism, the Spending Power, and Federal
Criminal Law, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (2003).
11. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
12. U.S. CONST. art. III, §§ 1, 2.
13. Cf. Kermit Roosevelt III & Richard W. Garnett, Judicial Activism and Its Crit-
ics, 155 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 112, 126-27 (2006) ("Professor Roosevelt and I
agree that, generally speaking, the job of 'weighing competing policies' is best 'left
to the representative branches for reasons of democratic accountability.' I would
also want to consider, though, the possibility that-putting aside concerns about
competence and 'accountability'- the Court might not always be constitutionally
authorized to take up the balancing task.").
14. See id. at 118 ("Clearly, appellate courts do and should 'defer' to lower courts
and non-judicial officials all the time.").
15. See, e.g., id. (challenging Professor Roosevelt's definitions of deference).
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often, as Professor Kermit Roosevelt and others have argued,
"excessive and unhelpful." 16 Even if one wants to hold on to
the view that the term is not entirely empty of content, and even
if one is not ready to conclude that judicial activism (properly
understood) is a myth, one can and should agree that the term
today often serves as little more than a slogan or epithet. For
present purposes, though, we can bracket the challenge of mak-
ing the case that judicial activism is not merely code for "deci-
sions with which I disagree." To say that federal judges can
and should refuse to give effect to local laws and values that
conflict with constitutional guarantees or that exceed constitu-
tional limits is not to say that they should do so lightly, quickly,
or too often. The Constitution commits us, as a national com-
munity, to certain values, which are reflected in and protected
by certain specific provisions of that document. At the same
time, an appreciation for the values associated with localism,
and an appropriate humility when it comes to second-guessing
political outcomes, will inspire wise judges to be cautious and
to hesitate before declaring that a particular expression of local
values must give way. Professor H. Jefferson Powell put it well
in his Walter F. Murphy Lecture, Constitutional Virtues, in
which he defined the virtue of "humility" as
the habit of doubting that the Constitution resolves divisive
political or social issues as opposed to requiring them to be
thrashed out through the processes of ordinary, revisable
politics.... The virtue manifests itself in the continuing rec-
ognition that the Constitution is primarily a framework for
political argument and decision and not a tool for the elimi-
nation of debate.17
That is a good start.
II.
So, how do we get it right? How should the conscientious
federal judge, or American citizen, go about trying to find the
place where responsible exercise of the judicial power of the
United States ends and unwarranted, offensive, intrusive, ho-
mogenizing overreaching begins? The task is not easy. Cer-
16. Id. at 112.
17. H. Jefferson Powell, Constitutional Virtues, 9 GREEN BAG 2D 379, 388 (2006).
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tainly, the line will not always be clear, and there is no point in
pretending otherwise. Certainly, it is not enough to merely at-
tach "activist" or "restrained" to decisions one likes or dislikes.
Certainly, the effort cannot be separated from the larger project
of figuring out the on-the-merits answers to questions of the
Constitution's meaning. All that said, the judicial philosophy of
my former boss, the late Chief Justice William Rehnquist, is
relevant and helpful here.
As the confirmation hearings for Chief Justice Roberts and
Justice Alito reminded us, tracking down nominees' judicial
philosophies is tiring, tricky work.18 Senate staffers, pundits,
journalists, and bloggers scour an ever-expanding range of
sources, including college research papers, job applications,
appellate briefs and opinions, and even thank-you notes19 look-
ing for clues (or smoking guns). As it happens, though, Chief
Justice (then Justice) Rehnquist provided a reflective and re-
vealing sketch of his philosophy just a few years after joining
the Court in a short essay called The Notion of a Living Constitu-
tion.20 This notion, often associated with Justice William Bren-
nan,21 was, in Chief Justice Rehnquist's view, to be resisted-
but not out of pious reverence for the Founders' insight into the
18. See, e.g., Mike Allen & R. Jeffrey Smith, Judges Should Have 'Limited' Role, Rob-
erts Says: Statement to Panel Cites Need for Restraint on Bench; Prior Documents Ques-
tion 'Right to Privacy,' WASH. POST, Aug. 3, 2005, at A5 ("Roberts echoed the views
of President Bush in describing his judicial philosophy. Roberts said that he views
the role of judges as 'limited' and that they 'do not have a commission to solve
society's problems, as they see them, but simply to decide cases before them ac-
cording to the rule of law."'); Senator Charles Schumer, Remarks of the Nomina-
tion of Samuel Alito to the Supreme Court (Oct. 31, 2005), available at http://
www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/10/31/AR2005103100707.html
("A preliminary review of his record raises real questions about Judge Alito's
judicial philosophy and his commitment to civil rights, workers' rights, women's
rights, and the rights of average Americans which the courts have always looked
out for.").
19. See Charles Babington, Miers Hit on Letters and the Law, WASH. POST, Oct. 15,
2005, at A7.
20. William H. Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 TEx. L. REV. 693
(1976), reprinted in 29 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 401, 410 (2006).
21. See, e.g., Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 816 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
("[T]he Constitution is not a static document whose meaning on every detail is
fixed for all time by the life experience of the Framers."); William J. Brennan, Jr.,
Construing the Constitution, 19 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 2, 7 (1985) ("[T]he genius of the
Constitution rests not in any static meaning it might have had in a world that is
dead and gone, but in the adaptability of its great principles to cope with current
problems and current needs.").
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moral, economic, and social challenges facing late-twentieth-
century society. 22 Nor did his critique purport to be the product
of a tight deduction from premises relating to the very nature of
a written constitution. He was not, to use Professor Sunstein's
term, a "fundamentalist," 23 or even a thoroughgoing, principled
originalist. He did not fail to observe and absorb the obvious fact
that ours is a very different world from the Framers'.
Chief Justice Rehnquist's aim in critiquing the notion of a liv-
ing Constitution, and in so doing, appearing to assume the un-
enviable "necrophiliac]" position of playing partisan for a
"dead" Constitution,24 was to insist and ensure that "We the
People," the "ultimate source of authority in this Nation," 25 act-
ing through our politically accountable representatives, retain
the right to serve (or not) as the agents of and vehicles for con-
stitutional change. What animates the essay is not so much a
misplaced attachment to stasis, or a slavish adherence to ideo-
logical formulae, but a clear-eyed appreciation for the tension
that can exist between the "antidemocratic and antimajoritarian
facets" of judicial review and the "political theory basic to de-
mocratic society."
26
22. See, e.g., Rehnquist, supra note 20, at 699 ("It seems to me that it is almost
impossible ... to conclude that [the Founders] intended the Constitution itself to
suggest answers to the manifold problems that they knew would confront suc-
ceeding generations."); cf. Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 717 (1977)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("Those who valiantly but vainly defended the heights
of Bunker Hill in 1775 made it possible that men such as James Madison might
later sit in the first Congress and draft the Bill of Rights to the Constitution. The
post-Civil War Congresses which drafted the Civil War Amendments to the Con-
stitution could not have accomplished their task without the blood of brave men
on both sides which was shed at Shiloh, Gettysburg, and Cold Harbor. If those
responsible for these Amendments, by feats of valor or efforts of draftsmanship,
could have lived to know that their efforts had enshrined in the Constitution the
right of commercial vendors of contraceptives to peddle them to unmarried minors
through such means as window displays and vending machines located in the
men's room of truck stops, notwithstanding the considered judgment of the New
York Legislature to the contrary, it is not difficult to imagine their reaction.").
23. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, RADICALS IN ROBES: WHY EXTREME RIGHT-WING COURTS
ARE WRONG FOR AMERICA 119-20 (2005) (discussing Chief Justice Rehnquist's
"fundamentalist" views regarding the right to marry).
24. Rehnquist, supra note 20, at 693 ("At first blush it seems certain that a living
Constitution is better than what must be its counterpart, a dead Constitution.").
25. Id. at 696.
26. Id. at 705. For a recent, powerful exploration of this tension, see Jeremy Wal-
dron, The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review, 115 YALE L.J. 1346 (2006).
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And so, Chief Justice Rehnquist contended, it is one thing to
note that the Constitution is, in many places, "not a specifically
worded document"; it is one thing to concede that "[tihere
is... wide room for honest difference of opinion over the
meaning of general phrases in the Constitution."27 It is another,
however, to authorize "nonelected members of the federal ju-
diciary" -functioning as "the voice and conscience of contem-
porary society" and "as the measure of the modem conception
of human dignity" 28-to serve as a "council of revision"
29
armed "with a roving commission to second-guess Congress,
state legislatures, and state and federal administrative officers
concerning what is best for the country."
30
Chief Justice Rehnquist's big-picture view of the Constitu-
tion, the government that it constitutes, and the task of federal
judges that it authorizes can be well and efficiently captured
through two short quotations from his opinions. First, from his
opinion for the Court in United States v. Lopez:
The Constitution creates a Federal Government of enumerated
powers. As James Madison wrote: "The powers delegated by
the proposed Constitution to the federal government are few
and defined. Those which are to remain in the State govern-
ments are numerous and indefinite." This constitutionally
mandated division of authority "was adopted by the Framers
to ensure protection of our fundamental liberties. Just as the
separation and independence of the coordinate branches of the
Federal Government serve to prevent the accumulation of ex-
cessive power in any one branch, a healthy balance of power
between the States and the Federal Government will reduce the
risk of tyranny and abuse from either front."31
Second, is this passage from his dissent in Texas v. Johnson:
The Court's role as the final expositor of the Constitution is
well established, but its role as a Platonic guardian admon-
ishing those responsible to public opinion as if they were
27. Rehnquist, supra note 20, at 697.
28. Id. at 695.
29. Id. at 698.
30. Id.; cf. Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 777 (1977) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)
("[Tlhis Court seems to regard the Equal Protection Clause as a cat-o'-nine-tails to
be kept in the judicial closet as a threat to legislatures which may, in the view of
the judiciary, get out of hand and pass 'arbitrary,' 'illogical,' or 'unreasonable'
laws.").
31. 514 U.S. 549, 552 (1995) (citations omitted).
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truant schoolchildren has no similar place in our system of
government.
3 2
These two passages go a long way in presenting the vision or, at
least, the disposition that plausibly can be said to have animated
Chief Justice Rehnquist's work and career on the Court, and that
could also be of some use, even comfort, to federal judges wres-
tling with the questions presented by this Symposium.
Chief Justice Rehnquist was a federalist, in the Madisonian
sense, and, within limits, a conservative majoritarian. He be-
lieved that "We the People," through our Constitution, had au-
thorized our federal courts, legislators, and administrators to
do many things, but not everything. The nation's powers are
vast where they exist, but they are also divided, separated,
"few and defined."33 As a result, the national government may
not pursue every good idea, smart policy, or worthy end, nor
are local governments forbidden to enact all foolish or immoral
ones. The point of this arrangement is not so much to ham-
string good government as to "ensure the protection of our
fundamental liberties" 34 by dividing, enumerating, and struc-
turing powers. The Constitution's freedom-facilitating struc-
tural features, Chief Justice Rehnquist believed, should not be
left entirely to the care of those branches that might not have,
or might not perceive clearly, an interest in their health. The
structure of government, as he emphasized in Lopez, matters to
the well-being and flourishing of persons, and it is appropriate
for courts of law to enforce the boundaries inherent or involved
in those structural features.35
The Texas v. Johnson dissent underscores a companion com-
mitment to judicial modesty with respect to moral controver-
sies and debatable policies.3 6 True, many regard Chief Justice
Rehnquist's "Platonic guardian" line,37 along with similar calls
for judicial modesty, restraint, and deference, as little more
than a disingenuous cover for his own conservative brand of
activism. But this charge is misplaced. It is neither arrogant nor
32. 491 U.S. 397, 435 (1989) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
33. THE FEDERALIST No. 45, at 137 (James Madison) (Roy P. Fairfield ed., 1981).
34. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991) (internal quotation marks omitted).
35. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 552.
36. See 491 U.S. at 430-31 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
37. Id. at 435.
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illegitimate for a judge to enforce the Constitution's structural
features, nor is it disingenuous for such a judge to believe that
federal courts should only rarely employ judicial review as an
"end run around popular government. ' 38 Running through
Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinions in cases involving a broad
spectrum of policy questions is not opportunistic conservative
activism but reasonably consistent fidelity to the idea that our
Constitution leaves many important, difficult, and even divi-
sive decisions to the People or, for our purposes, to local com-
munities. It is possible and reasonable to distinguish between
votes to invalidate the policy choices of state legislatures as in-
consistent with the Constitution's substantive individual-rights
provisions, on the one hand, and votes to invalidate regulatory
measures enacted by Congress as outside Congress's enumer-
ated powers, on the other. It is one thing to invalidate federal
laws for reasons having to do with the distribution of power; it
is another to strike down local laws as misuses of power.
To be sure, the Constitution has countermajoritarian features.
It effectively removes certain questions (such as "Should we
criminalize seditious libel?" 39 or "Should Congress select the
Russian Orthodox Archbishop of New York?" 40 ) from the po-
litical arena. At the same time, it is a document that reflects
strong commitments to popular sovereignty and that relies at
least as much on constitutional structure and institutional de-
sign as on judicial review to constrain majorities' resolutions of
challenging moral questions.
41
38. Rehnquist, supra note 20, at 706; see Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702,
735 (1997) (observing that "[t]hroughout the Nation, Americans are engaged in an
earnest and profound debate about the morality, legality, and practicality of phy-
sician-assisted suicide. Our holding permits this debate to continue, as it should in
a democratic society.").
39. See U.S. CONST. amend. I; N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 276 (1964)
(discussing the unconstitutionality of criminalizing seditious libel).
40. See U.S. CONST. amend. I; cf. Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94
(1952) (striking down New York law purporting to transfer control of Russian
Orthodox churches from the governing hierarchy of the Russian Orthodox
Church to the governing authorities of the Russian Church in America).
41. It is incorrect to conclude, as Professor Chemerinsky does, that Chief Justice
Rehnquist's willingness and ability to enforce the Constitution's structural fea-
tures represents a departure from, or is in tension with, his "majoritarianism." See
Erwin Chemerinsky, Understanding the Rehnquist Court, 47 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 659,
662-63 (2003).
[Vol. 32
No. 1] Judicial Review, Local Values, and Pluralism 15
III.
This panel's focus has been on the homogenizing threat that
judicial review can pose to local communities' distinctive val-
ues and legal experiments. We have been considering the
worry that when federal judges second-guess local-values-
reflecting policies, it can be difficult to hold the line between
enforcing the Constitution's trumping commitments-our
shared commitments-and imposing their own preferences.
This worry is not frivolous, but there is no easy way to soothe it.
Although judicial review of local legislation does threaten to
undermine local identity by homogenizing community norms,
such review is both helpful and necessary to the task of protect-
ing the institutions, groups, associations, and communities that
generate, nurture, test, express, and advocate for those norms.
In a case like Romer v. Evans, 42 for example, the Supreme
Court's exercise of judicial review can be seen as homogenizing
local norms by subordinating their expression in local ordi-
nances to the requirements of the Equal Protection Clause.43 In
a decision like Boy Scouts of America v. Dale,44 on the other hand,
the Court's invalidation of a law reflecting local values can
perhaps be seen as protecting the existence and independence
of competing and diverse sources of meaning.45 Put simply, to
the extent that one cares about values-pluralism, judicial re-
view can be a friend as well as a foe.
As it happens, this point also finds support in the work and
views of Chief Justice Rehnquist. As Professor John McGinnis
has explored in some detail,46 a powerful and pervasive theme
in the Rehnquist Court's decisions is recognition and even
celebration of the place and function of mediating institutions
in civil society.47 The landscape that is created, regulated, and
reflected by the Constitution includes more than a federal gov-
42. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
43. U.S. CONST. amend. XrV, § 1.
44. 530 U.S. 640 (2000).
45. See generally Garnett, Henry Adams's Soul, supra note *.
46. See generally John 0. McGinnis, Reviving Tocqueville's America: The Rehnquist
Court's Jurisprudence of Social Discovery, 90 CAL. L. REV. 485 (2002).
47. See, e.g., Boy Scouts, 530 U.S. at 648 (noting that the freedom of association is
"especially important in preserving political and cultural diversity and in shield-
ing dissident expression from suppression by the majority" (internal quotation
marks omitted) (quoting Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 622 (1984))).
Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy
ernment and states, and more than persons and governments.
The structural features of that charter both preserve and clear
out the space of civil society in which associations and mediat-
ing institutions work to safeguard political liberty and con-
strain political authority. Associations, therefore, serve a num-
ber of critical purposes:
[A]ssociations have a structural, as well as a vehicular, pur-
pose. They hold back the bulk of government and are the
"critical buffers between the individual and the power of the
State." They are "laboratories of innovation" that clear out
the civic space needed to "sustain the expression of the rich
pluralism of American life." Associations are not only con-
duits for expression, they are the scaffolding around which
civil society is constructed, in which personal freedoms are
exercised, in which loyalties are formed and transmitted,
and in which individuals flourish. 48
The same judicial review that we might fear could impose un-
welcome moral uniformity is, it turns out, sometimes necessary
to preserve the freedoms of associations upon which a healthy
moral conversation depends.
48. Garnett, Henry Adams's Soul, supra note *, at 1853-54.
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